We design an experiment to examine welfare and behavior in a multi-level trust game representing a pass through investment in an intermediated market. In a repeated game, an Investor invests via an Intermediary who lends to a Borrower. A pre-experiment one-shot version of the game serves as a baseline and to type each subject. We alter the transparency of exchanges between non-adjacent parties. We find transparency of the exchanges between the investor and intermediary does not significantly affect welfare. However, transparency regarding exchanges between the intermediary and borrower promotes trust on the part of the investor, increasing welfare. Further, this has asymmetric effects: borrowers and intermediaries achieve greater welfare benefits than investors. We discuss implications for what specific aspects of financial market transparency may facilitate more efficiency.
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Transparency, Efficiency and the Distribution of Economic Welfare in Pass-Through Investment Trust Games
Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) investigate trust and reciprocity in a two-player investment trust game. Since then, the game has been studied extensively. Ostrom and Walker (2005), among others, review the literature and identify that social distance, communication and reputation all affect the degree of trust and reciprocity. The primary focus is on one-to-one trust and reciprocity behavior.
In reality, many situations require multiple levels of trust. For example, when a person invests in a bond fund, he or she trusts the fund manager not to misrepresent the bonds in the fund. The fund manager, in turn, must trust the bond issuers. Alternatively, consider collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). In the home mortgage market, institutional arrangements emerged in which mortgages were originated by one firm (e.g., Country Wide), sold to an investment banker that assembled them into large packages, and issued Mortgage Backed Securities (a kind of CDO) that were in turn sold to investors. Investors trusted the originators to perform due diligence in evaluating the risk of borrowers, and security issuers to provide adequate data trails and loan servicing arrangements. This chain required multiple levels of trust to justify investment. As the recent financial crisis shows, the breakdown of these serial trust relations can have drastic implications.
Financial market crises frequently prompt calls for reform that include greater transparency.
For example, in a letter to the G20 on June 16, 2010, President Obama states: "We should support efforts to enhance transparency and increase disclosure by our large financial 2 institutions." He further asks for: "More transparency and disclosure to promote market integrity and reduce market manipulation." (Obama, 2010) . Transparency is often one of the goals of regulation ranging from current calls for reform to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Securities and Exchange Act. One of the stated goals of the Securities and Exchange Commission is: "a far more active, efficient, and transparent capital market that facilitates the capital formation so important to our nation's economy." 1 However, it is difficult to draw clear conclusions about the effects of transparency alone in naturally occurring environments. Usually, regulation promoting transparency is tied to other reforms and occurs during a time of other changes to the economy (e.g., the Securities and Exchange Act). Here, using a multi-level trust game, we study transparency in a controlled investment/trust environment to isolate its effects.
The conventional two-player trust game is commonly interpreted as an investment game. An investor (the first player) invests money with a trustee (the second player) who employs it productively and chooses how much, if any, to return to the investor. Because each player is involved in each transaction and, hence, observes the play of all players, the game is completely transparent. Our game extends this to include a financial intermediary, creating a three-player trust game by adding a third player (the intermediary). This allows us to control transparency by changing whether each player can observe the play of all others or only observe transactions involving the player directly.
In our game, the three players move sequentially. The first player (the investor) initiates the process by sending money (any portion of his endowment) to the second player (the 1 http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml#corpfin, accessed 10/27/2010. 3 intermediary) with the amount being tripled. One can interpret the tripled amount as the case where the intermediary creates value through the intermediation process (e.g., through pooling investments, diversification and increased liquidity). The intermediary then decides how much of the tripled amount to loan to the third player (the borrower), with the amount being tripled again.
This can be interpreted as putting the money to productive resource use. The borrower chooses how much to return to the intermediary who, in turn, chooses how much to return to the investor.
This effectively creates an intermediated market, generating gains from specialization and trade from two interactions based on trust and reciprocity.
Our game is repeated, but we use an independent one-shot pre-experiment version to type the behavior of each subject in his or her role and for comparison with the repeated version. In the one-shot setting, we find that transparency has little effect. However, in the repeated setting, transparency of exchanges between the intermediary and borrower increase efficiency and payoffs to all parties. Transparency of exchanges between the investor and intermediary has no significant effect upon efficiency. Only transparency in respect to the borrower and intermediary exchanges matters. Transparency regarding the exchanges between the other parties does not.
Further, we find that it is the transparency, and not the specific exchanges, that increases welfare.
Last, we find that benefits are asymmetric. The borrowers and intermediaries benefit more than the investors from the ability of investors to view the borrower/intermediary transactions.
The elements of our three-player trust game can be found in the existing literature. First, our three-player trust game is related to the three-player centipede game with a binary choice space indirect reciprocity where the first individual may help the second, the second help the third, and so on until the last, who in turn may help the first. As in a two-player trust game, the authors find that pure indirect reciprocity enables mutual trust in the multi-player environment. 2 Finally, the three-player trust game is related to a 3-person ultimatum game by Buchner et al. (2004) . While related, none of this research studies a direct, multi-level trust game that corresponds to pass through securities nor varies transparency in such games.
In the next section, we lay out our experiment. Then, we discuss our results in Section II and follow with discussion in Section III.
I Experimental Environment, Design and Procedures
A Three-Player Trust Game
We implement the three-player linear trust game shown in Figure 1 . In the first stage, the investor sends some portion, s1, of his endowment of 10 experimental dollars to an intermediary. Wedekind and Milinski (2000) provide experimental evidence on indirect reciprocity in a "repeated helping game" developed by Nowak and Sigmund (1998) . In this game, donors decide whether or not to provide costly help to the recipients they are matched with, based on information about the recipient's behavior in encounters with third parties.
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borrower. The amount again triples. The borrower sends back some amount, r3, to the intermediary. Finally, the intermediary sends back an amount, r2, to the investor.
B Experimental Design and Procedures
We design four treatments as given in Table I to study how the level of transparency affects trust and reciprocity. In each treatment, the investor is endowed with 10 experimental dollars and the game proceeds according to the rules described here.
In the baseline treatment No-T (stands for "no transparency"), parties can only observe their bilateral interactions, i.e. the investor cannot see the interactions between the intermediary and the borrower, and the borrower cannot see the interactions between the intermediary and the investor. In the Borrower-T treatment, the interactions between the intermediary and the investor are transparent to the borrower. In the Investor-T treatment, the interactions between the borrower and intermediary are transparent to the investor. Finally, in the Full-T treatment there is "full" transparency, so all parties can see the interactions of all pairs.
The experiment was conducted at Chapman University at the Economic Science Institute.
Subjects were recruited from a standard subject pool consisting primarily of undergraduate students. Subjects interacted with each other anonymously over a local computer network. The experiment was programmed and conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The computers were placed within individual cubicles in such a way that all subjects could only view their own computer screen.
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At the beginning of each session, subjects were given the instructions for the one-shot threeplayer trust game. An experimenter read the instructions aloud while each subject followed along with their own copy of the instructions. 3 All subjects were randomly assigned to a specific role, designated generically as player 1, player 2, or player 3 to avoid any value-laden terminology.
Player 1 was endowed with 10 experimental dollars. In the first stage, player 1 made a decision on how much to send to player 2 (any integer between 0 and 10) and how much to keep. Each dollar sent by player 1 was tripled. In the second stage, player 2 made a decision on how much to send to player 3. The amount sent by player 2 was also tripled. In the third stage, player 3 made a decision on how much to return to player 2 and how much to keep. Finally, in the fourth stage, player 2 made a decision on how much to return to player 1 and how much to keep. All subjects were told that player 1, player 2, and player 3 can send some, all, or none of the amount available to them.
After all subjects completed the one-shot experiment, an experimenter announced a second part of the experiment that lasted for 10 periods. No indication of this second part had been given before subjects participated in the first part of the experiment to avoid any potential super-game strategies. The subjects also had not been told that the experiment would end after the first part.
In the second part of the experiment, all subjects remained in the same role assignments (i.e., player 1, 2, or 3) as in the first part of the experiment. However, they were randomly re-grouped with other subjects who were in different roles to form a completely new three-player group.
Subjects stayed in their newly formed groups for all 10 periods of the second part of the 7 experiment. It was commonly known that the new pairings would last for 10 periods and that the experiment would end at that time. Each period corresponded to the three-player trust game and it proceeded in exactly the same way as the first part of the experiment. This procedure allowed subjects to participate in a single play of the game, without knowledge of a second 10-period repeat play version of the same stage game, as implemented by Burnham et al (2000) in their trust games. Hence, in one sitting, data are obtained from both single play and repeat play versions of the same game. We use the decisions in the single play version to type the playing characteristics of every subject for subsequent analysis.
After completing both parts of the experiment, subjects were paid for the decisions they made in the one-shot three-player trust game in the first part of the experiment. Also, subjects were paid for one randomly selected play of the 10 decision periods in the second part of the experiment. The earnings were paid privately in cash (US dollars) and each experimental session lasted for about 50 minutes. Experimental dollars where converted to US dollars at a rate of 2 experimental dollars to one US dollar. The average experimental earnings, including a $7 participation fee, were $23.15, ranging from a low of $8 to a high of $79. No subject participated more than once, and no subject had prior experience with a similar experimental environment. choices (s1), the intermediaries' (s2 and r2), and the borrowers' (r3). The independent variables are dummy-variables for Investor-T and Borrower-T treatments. Examining the data from the one-shot three-player trust game (first period), we find no difference in individual behavior and no differences in efficiency across treatments. 4 There is also no apparent difference in distribution of individual decisions across treatments. This leads to our first result:
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II Results
A Efficiency and Payoffs in a One-Shot Trust Game
Result 1: Transparency does not change aggregate behavior nor efficiency significantly in a one-shot multi-level trust game. 
Efficiency and Payoffs in a Repeated Trust Game
In contrast to the results in the one-shot game, there are significant differences in behavior across treatments in repeated games (Panel B and C of Table II) . Treatments with investor and full transparency result in higher amounts sent, amounts returned and efficiencies. Players of all types tended to have higher payoffs. Table IV reports regression results that examine the effect of transparency upon efficiency and payoffs over time for the repeated game. In each column, we report the coefficient estimates and robust standard errors for the player's choices. 5 In addition to the aforementioned dummy-variables for Investor-T and Borrower-T treatments, we include an inverse period variable (1/Period) to control for learning (i.e, 1/2, 1/3, 1/4, . . . , 1/11). As shown in regression (1) of Table IV , transparency affects efficiency in the repeated game. In particular, giving the investor full information about the transactions between the intermediary and borrower significantly increases efficiency. In contrast, giving the borrower full information about the investor and intermediary interactions, if anything, decreases efficiency.
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Result 2. Providing transparency to the investor (i.e., allowing the investor to see the exchange between the intermediary and the borrower) increases efficiency, while providing transparency to the borrower (i.e., allowing the borrower to see the exchange between the investor and intermediary) has no significant effect on average efficiency.
Beyond the overall welfare measure, we examine profits of each player in regression (2).
The treatment variable Investor-T is positive for all parties, albeit insignificant for the borrower.
Shown in Table II , payoffs for the investor increase with full information (in respect to the investor), increasing 14 percent on average. When the investor had transparency, in the Investor-T and Full-T treatments, the average payoffs for the intermediary increased 21 percent and average payoffs increased 14 percent for the borrower. As a result, everyone benefits from investor having transparency. In contrast to the investor, when the borrower had full information, denoted by the treatment variable Borrower-T, his payoff did not change significantly (if anything, it decreased). Interestingly, the borrower fared worse in the Borrower-T than in the No-T treatment, where the average payoffs dropped from 18.3 to 13.6.
Result 3. Providing transparency to the investor increases payoffs to all players, while providing transparency to the borrower does not change payoffs significantly.
Similar to estimation results for payoffs, regression (3) in Table IV Interestingly, the intermediary's and borrower's proportions increase over time, while investor's proportion decreases, indicating significant learning.
Determinants of Behavior in a Repeated Trust Game
The gains from exchange, and hence payoffs and efficiency, are driven by the (multiplied) amounts sent, not the amounts returned. So in order to generate economic surplus, transparency has to affect the amounts sent by the investor and intermediary; while the amounts returned by the borrower and intermediary distribute the surplus and provide the reciprocity needed to encourage future efficiency through higher future amounts sent. To measure these effects, we examine the individual behavior of the players and the determinants that influence such behavior. IType, the intermediary has one representing the amount sent to the borrower (used in regression (2)) and another representing the amount sent back to the investor (used in regression (4)). In this procedure, we are combining and extending techniques developed in two previous papers.
Rigdon, et al, (2007) identified the IType of each subject in an extensive form trust game in the first period of a twenty period repeated game, and found this variable highly significant in explaining subsequent behavior in the different treatment conditions they studied. By following Burnham et al. (2000) in observing decisions in a pre-experiment single play version, followed by a repeat play version, we are able to measure IType before subjects know they are going to participate in a repeated version of the same game. 7 Thus, we test whether this independent
IType measure persists as a predictive procedure for subject behavior in a repeated version of the same stage game.
In addition, we include independent variables representing the observable choices in the current period: S1, S2, R3, and S1Vis which is S1 when visible to the borrower. Also we include 13 variables representing the prior period's observable choices: LagS1, LagS2, LagR3, LagR2, and LagS1Vis, LagS2Vis, LagR3Vis and LagR2Vis which are last period's choices when observable to the appropriate player.
As per the regressions (1) -(4) in Table V We observe that the IType coefficient is significant in all of these regressions, confirming the methedological value of our pre-experiment measurement of a person's characteristic willingness to trust. This is important in separating out a source of variation that enables better estimation of treatment and other effects. Finally we return to the intermediary in regression (4) to examine the amount returned to the investor. The amount sent by the investor, S1, and the amount returned by the borrower, R3, increase the amount returned to the investor, whereas the amount sent to the borrower decreased it. The amount sent by the investor last period, LagS1, and returned by the borrower, LagR3, also are predictive, as is the amount returned by the intermediary last period, LagR2. Again, the intermediary type behavior is marked significantly by her choice in the one-shot game. As with the intermediary's sending decision, the treatment dummies Investor-T and Borrower-T do not load, as we argue the treatment effects are captured by S1 and R3 where transparency differs over treatments. The average amount returned to the investor was 0.55 times the amount returned by the borrower in the No-T and Investor-T treatments, increased to 0.57 in the Full-T 15 treatment, but decreased 0.48 in the Borrower-T treatment, where the borrower was not privy to the amount returned to the investor.
In summary, the multivariate results show that:
(1) Players typed as trusting and/or reciprocating in the one-shot setting tend to continue that behavior in the repeated setting. There is also significant persistence in investor and borrower behavior across rounds in the repeated setting.
(2) Investor transparency increases the initial investments and overall efficiency as a result.
(3) More investment creates more lending and more lending creates more return to the intermediary and investor.
(4) History matters in a complex and interesting way. Intermediaries seem to learn through time while all subjects appear affected by how other subjects treated them in the prior period. Specifically, learning through time reduces the willingness of intermediaries to make loans, while good prior returns increases the amounts investors invest.
The history effect creates an interesting, but complex, dynamic relationship. In particular, the coefficients on LagR3 in regressions (2) and (4) suggest that, if borrowers do not pay back intermediaries, subsequent loans and returns to investors fall. Then, the coefficient on LagR2 in regression (1) suggests that investors will invest less in subsequent periods. This dynamic would drive down efficiency and economic welfare. On the other hand, higher loan repayment rates would drive the opposite dynamic outcomes.
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III Discussion and Extensions
We design an experiment to examine welfare and behavior in a multi-level investment trust game. In the scenario an Investor invests via an Intermediary who lends to a Borrower in a repeated game. We alter the transparency of exchanges between non-adjacent parties. We find that transparency does not change aggregate behavior nor efficiency in a one-shot multi-level trust game. However, in repeated multi-level trust games, transparency matters. Providing transparency to the investor (i.e., allowing the investor to see the exchange between the intermediary and the borrower) increases efficiency and payoffs to all players, while providing transparency to the borrower (i.e., allowing the borrower to see the exchange between the investor and intermediary) does not change efficiency and payoffs. Providing transparency to the investor also shifts the distribution of payoffs towards intermediaries and borrowers, while providing transparency to the borrower does not change the distribution of payoffs.
We introduce and test the ability of a one-shot game to measure the trust characteristics of subjects and to predict trusting behavior in a subsequent repeated version of the same stage game. This procedure may have value in other applications not yet explored.
Overall, our findings indicate that in the multi-level trust game transparency can matter, improving outcomes in financial markets and economic welfare. On the other hand, only one side of transparency matters. For financial markets this implies that not all forms of transparency are equal in their ability to improve market outcomes. In the analog pass through securities market (the collateralized, home mortgage debt obligation market we discussed in the introduction), the ability to verify the credit worthiness of borrowers would seem to be the most important aspect of transparency. In addition, transparency affects welfare asymmetrically.
When transparency matters, it is borrowers and intermediaries benefit more than investors in relative terms. If the policy goal of the government is to make home ownership (and borrowing in general) more accessible, then investor transparency (allowing investors to see the transactions between intermediaries and the ultimate borrowers) can facilitate this while shifting economic welfare toward the ultimate borrowers.
There are several obvious extensions to our research. First, trust relationship may involve even higher orders and our game would be easy to generalize to three or more levels. Second, trust may be circular instead of linear as we have in our game. It would be simple to design a game where either the borrower gave back money both to the investor and intermediary or, This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. Various research agencies have provided funds for this research. The currency used in the experiment is experimental dollars, and they will be converted to U.S. Dollars at a rate of _2_ experimental dollars to _1_ dollar. At the end of experiment your earnings will be paid to you in private and in cash. It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at other people's work. If you have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation.
Tables and Figures
The 24 participants in today's experiment will be randomly assigned into 8 three-player groups.
In addition to the group assignment each participant will also be randomly assigned to a specific type in the group, designated as Player 1, Player 2, or Player 3. You and the other two participants in your group will make choices that will determine your payoffs. The experiment consists of four decision stages. At the end of Stage 4 the total earnings are reported to each person. This experiment is now over and your earnings will be part of the total you will be paid.
